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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) . This case was poured over to the Utah
Court of Appeals by action dated March 21, 1996.

(R229)

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issues;
I.

Whether the District Court erred in determining that
a vested right is the same thing under law as a nonconforming use, in view of the Utah statutes and Salt
Lake County ordinances that define the concept of
"non-conforming use."

II.

Whether the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment has
jurisdiction

over

(i)

development

applications

involving vested rights or (ii) appeals from action by
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission on such
applications.
III.

Whether

Stonebridge

exhausted

its

administrative

remedies by filing its development application with
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, presenting
the application at a hearing before the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission, and presenting the matter
to the Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners.
IV.

Whether Stonebridge was required to request a variance
from the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment in order
to exhaust its administrative remedies.
1

V.

Whether

Stonebridge

is

entitled

to

declaratory

judgment resolving the vested rights issue presented,
or, at the very least, determining who can resolve the
vested rights issue, under circumstances where the
Salt

Lake

County

Planning

Commission

refused

to

consider the merits of Stonebridge's conditional use
application until the vested rights issue is first
decided.
VI.

Whether it was error for the lower court to grant
summary judgment on a motion to dismiss that both
parties treated as a motion to dismiss both in their
filings and oral argument.

Standard of Review:
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness.

United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City

Co. , 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Society of Separationists, Inc.
v. Taqqart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993); Casco Servs. Corp. v.
Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992); McMahan v. Dee's, 873 P.2d
1172, 1175 (Utah App. 1994); Wade v. Stanql, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah
App. 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group, 868 P.2d
1110,

1112

(Utah App. 1994).

Pursuant to this standard, no

particular deference is given to the trial court7s ruling on
questions of law.

State v. Penaf 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);

Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah
1993); Hiqgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
2

Issues Preserved for Appeal;
All issues presented are based on legal rulings made by the
lower court interpreting and applying the law in the context of a
motion to dismiss. The issues were preserved by written memoranda
and oral argument in opposition to defendants'/appellees Motion to
Dismiss

(R82-141, 170-185, 230-266), and the Notice of Appeal

(R219-221).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(1) defining a non-conforming

2.

Zoning

use.
ordinance

of

Salt Lake County, § 19.04.385,

defining non-conforming use.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707(5), prohibiting the Board of

Adjustment from granting use variances.
4.

Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.92.040(E),

prohibiting the Board of Adjustment from granting use variances.
5.

Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.84.110,

indicating that "a person shall have the right to appeal to the
Board of County Commissioners any decision rendered by the Planning
Commission.fl
6.

Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.92.030,

defining the power of the Board of Adjustment.
7.

Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.92.050(C),

prohibiting the Board of Adjustment from considering appeals on
conditional use decisions.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A«

Nature of the Case.

This case arises from the dismissal of Stonebridge's Complaint
before the Third District Court on a motion to dismiss, treated by
the lower court as a motion for summary judgment.
Stonebridge

filed

its complaint

against

the defendants,

appellees with the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February

10, 1995.

The

complaint raised four causes of action:
1.

Declaratory judgment concerning vested rights;

2.

A determination that Stonebridge had development rights

arising from the doctrine of zoning estoppel.
3.

That the action of the County constituted a taking of

plaintiff's property without just compensation in violation of
Article I Section 2 2 of the Utah Constitution, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
4.

That the zoning ordinances preventing development of

plaintiff's property are unconstitutional as applied, resulting in
a

taking

of

plaintiff's

property

without

just compensation.

(R3-27)
Defendants/appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on or about March 7, 1995.

(R45-46) The motion to dismiss came on

for hearing on June 19, 1995 before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba,
District Court Judge.

The lower court took the matter under

advisement at the conclusion of oral arguments and by memorandum
4

decision dated August 10, 1995 (R191-203) , granted summary judgment
dismissing the complaint.

A question concerning the appropriate

form of the order was resolved by minute entry of the Court dated
December 20, 1995 (R215) , on which date the Court entered its final
order

granting

summary

judgment,

dismissing

defendants/appellees' motion to dismiss.

the

complaint

on

(R216-218)

Stonebridge filed its notice of appeal on January 19, 1996.
(R219-221)
B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

In April of 1980, an application for the Stonebridge

P.U.D. was filed to develop a 29.5 acre parcel of property located
in Salt Lake County into a 75-unit condominium P.U.D.
2.
sion

On June 10, 1980, the Salt Lake County Planning Commis-

granted

approval

Stonebridge P.U.D.
3.

(R7)

for

a

69-unit

development

within

the

(R7)

Salt Lake County permitted development of the Stonebridge

P.U.D. in phases.

Each new phase was begun immediately as the

prior phase was completed and sold.
and sold in 1993.

The third phase was completed

Much of the infrastructure that would service

Phase IV, the subject phase, was completed during and in connection
with the construction of Phases II and III.
4.

(R7)

In 1993, while Phase III was being sold, Stonebridge Land

Holding Company ("Stonebridge") began preparations to request final
approval for Phase IV, the subject phase, which includes 16 units
located

in eight buildings on 4.139

Stonebridge P.U.D.

(R9-10)
5

acres within the approved

5.

In 1994, despite the Stonebridge P.U.D. application and

Salt Lake County's approval thereof, approval and construction of
Phases I, II and III, and the construction of much of the infrastructure that would service Phase IV, Salt Lake County adopted an
ordinance down-zoning the subject property.
6.

(RIO)

Stonebridge requested final approval to develop Phase IV

of the Stonebridge P.U.D. by filing a conditional use application
on that phase.

But, on November 8, 1994, the Salt Lake County

Planning Commission denied the request on the basis that the
Planning

Commission

lacked

jurisdiction

to determine

Stonebridge had vested rights to proceed with development.
The notice is attached to the Appendix as Tab 3.

whether
(R126)

The Planning

Commission stated that, "the Planning Commission is not a court of
law and cannot make a decision until the vested rights issue is
resolved. . . .

It has to be resolved outside of this body."

Official Minutes of Salt Lake County Planning Commission, October 25, 1994.

(R128)

The referenced minutes are attached to the

Appendix as Tab 2.
7.

Stonebridge requested review of that decision by the Salt

Lake County Commission, pursuant to ordinance and notice from the
county requiring that any request for review be taken to the Salt
Lake County Commission.

(RH)

The Ordinance is attached to the

Appendix as Tab 1, the Notice (included with the County Planning
Commission November 8, 1994 letter) is attached to the Appendix as
Tab 4.

6

$*

The County Commission affirmed the decisions of the

Planning Commission without further hearing.
9.

(RH)

This action was brought in the Third District Court, in

part, to obtain the predicate vested rights determination the
Planning Commission required before it would consider the merits of
the

Stonebridge

application

for

final

Phase

IV

construction

approval.
10.

The Complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District

Court on February 10, 1995 requesting relief that Stonebridge had
vested rights entitling it to the conditional use application it
requested; that Salt Lake County was estopped from denying the
conditional use application by principles of zoning estoppel; and
for just compensation for the regulatory taking of plaintiff's
property.
11.

(R3)
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint

arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted and that the District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the case.
12.

(R45-46)

The basis of defendants' motion was the allegation that

the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment was the proper body to
consider Stonebridge's development application involving vested
rights or to consider the appeal from the Planning Commission.
Consequently, the County argued Stonebridge did not exhaust its
administrative remedies and failed to satisfy requirements of
ripeness and finality.

(R45-46)

7

13.

Stonebridge responded that, as a matter of law, the Board

of Adjustment does not have jurisdiction to consider Stonebridge's
development application in the first instance, or to consider the
appeal

from the Planning

Commission, under the statutes and

ordinances defining the power and authority of the Board of
Adjustment, and that the County Planning Commission and the Board
of County Commissioners to whom Stonebridge presented the issue
were the proper bodies to consider the application.

Consequently,

Stonebridge argued its administrative remedies were exhausted and
that the requirements of ripeness and finality were satisfied.
(R82-92, 170-182)
14.

On

June

19,

1995, oral

argument

was

presented

on

defendants7 motion to dismiss, and the court took the matter under
advisement.
15.

By Memorandum

Decision

dated

August

10, 1995, the

District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing
all causes of action of the Complaint.

(R192-203)

A copy of the

Court's Memorandum Decision is attached to the Appendix as Tab 5.
16.

By Minute Entry dated December 20, 1995, the District

Court determined that the motion to dismiss should be treated as if
it were a motion for summary judgment, even though both parties
treated it as a motion to dismiss in their written memoranda and in
oral argument.
17.

(R215)

On December 20, 199 5, the District Court entered its

Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing

8

Stonebridge's Complaint.

(R216-218)

A copy of the Court's Order

is attached to the Appendix as Tab 6.
18.
1996.

Stonebridge filed its Notice of Appeal on January 19,

(R219-221)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars, have been
spent in developing the multi-phased development of the 29.5 acre
Stonebridge Planned Unit Development, approved by Salt Lake County
in 1980.
completed.

Three phases of development within P.U.D. have been
Additional thousands of dollars have been invested in

infrastructure for Phase IV.

Final approval for completion of

Phase IV development has been requested.

However, midstream in

development of the Stonebridge P.U.D., the area of where the P.U.D.
is located was down-zoned.
Principles of vested rights require Salt Lake County to permit
completion of Phase IV of the Stonebridge P.U.D. consistent with
the zoning regulations and ordinances in effect when application
for the P.U.D. was made, and when approval was granted.

The Utah

Supreme Court has roundly criticized the notion that down-zoning
property mid-stream in development would bar further development:
A property owner should be able to plan for
developing his property in a manner permitted
by existing zoning regulation with some degree
of assurance that the basic ground rules will
not be changed mid-stream.
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396
(Utah 1980).

To protect the rights of land owners and developers

from ex post facto application of zoning ordinances, the Utah
9

Supreme Court adopted one of the more
doctrines in the country.

liberal vested rights

See Western Land Equities; Contracts

Funding & Mortgage Exchange v. Maines. 527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974) (a
property owner "cannot be circumscribed by ex post facto modus
operandi legis, such as zoning ordinances presumed to upside-down
the hour glass").
But the Salt Lake County Planning Commission refused to
consider

the merits

of the Stonebridge Phase

IV development

application until a determination is made on the vested rights
issue.

At Stonebridge's hearing with the Planning Commission on

the issue, the Commission indicated:
The Planning Commission is not a court of law,
and cannot make a decision until the vested
right issue is resolved . . . .
Official Minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission,
October 25, 1994.

The County Commission affirmed that decision

without hearing or comment.
More than two years after Stonebridge filed its Conditional
Use Application for Phase IV final approval, it has not yet had an
opportunity to present the merits of its application. This action
was commenced, in part, to obtain the vested rights determination
requested by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission.
The lower court refused to pass on the vested rights issue.
Instead, it ruled that the Board of Adjustment must make that
determination.

However, the Board of Adjustment has never been

granted authority to make such a decision.

10

The lower court's

ruling runs directly contrary to the controlling statutes of the
State of Utah and ordinances of Salt Lake County.
The Board of Adjustment has no authority to grant relief by
way of a variance.
use

variance

Neither

can

Any such ruling would constitute an unlawful

expressly

prohibited

it decide vested

by

rights

statute

and ordinance.

issues pursuant to its

authority to deal with non-conforming uses.

The statutes and

ordinances of this case clearly demonstrate that a non-conforming
use is distinct and different from a vested right, and the Board of
Adjustment has never been granted authority to resolve vested
rights issues.

Further, the Statutes of this State and the

Ordinances of Salt Lake County require that applications for
Conditional Use Permits, such as the permit Stonebridge filed for
final Phase IV development approval, must be filed with the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission, and any appeals therefrom must be
taken to the County Commission.

The Board of Adjustment is

expressly prohibited by Ordinance from considering such applications or appeals.
The lower court's determination that Stonebridge failed to
exhaust administrative remedies is plain error.

To the contrary,

Stonebridge spent nearly a year, and thousands of dollars and
hundreds of hours in fully and conscientiously exhausting any
applicable administrative remedies.
The lower court's ruling that the action is barred because it
was not timely appealed to the District Court is also in error.
This action is not an appeal from any substantive land use decision
11

of the County.

The County never considered the merits of Stone-

bridge's development application. Instead, the Planning Commission
determined that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the vested rights
issue because it was not a court of law and requested a determination of that vested rights issue before it could proceed with the
merits of the application.
affirmed without hearing.
part,

to

obtain

requested.

the

The Salt Lake County Commission

Consequently, this action was filed, in

vested

rights

determination

the

County

None of the causes of action of the Complaint involve

appeals from the action of the Planning Commission and County
Commission.
Finally, the lower court erred in its determination that a
lack of administrative finality and ripeness barred Stonebridge's
claims.

Stonebridge

fully and conscientiously

applicable administrative remedies.

exhausted all

The lower court ruled that

Stonebridge should have sought a variance before it commenced its
claims.

But that ruling runs counter to the law.

The only

variance that would help is a use variance, which is prohibited
both by statute and ordinance.

The law is well-settled that

seeking a variance under such circumstances is not required.

In

any event, the "futility" rule excuses any alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies to finality.
The

lower court's decision

is directly

contrary to the

controlling statutes of the State of Utah and ordinances of Salt
Lake County that are controlling.
and should be reversed.
12

It is wrong as a matter of law,

ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT MUST RESOLVE THE ISSUE
OP VESTED RIGHTS.
The fundamental premise of the lower court's decision is that
the Board of Adjustment

is empowered to resolve vested rights

claims

conditional

implicit

in

the

Stonebridge in this case.
law.

use

application

filed

by

But that premise is wrong as a matter of

It overlooks, and directly contradicts, numerous controlling

statutes of this state and ordinances of Salt Lake County.
The Court based its decision on a flawed interpretation of
§ 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, which
specifies the powers of the Board of Adjustment.

That Ordinance

provides as follows:1
The board of adjustment shall:
A.

Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions , applying the zoning ordinances as
provided in § 19.92.050;

B#

Hear and decide the special exceptions to
the terms of the zoning ordinance set
forth in § 19.92.060;

C.

Hear and decide variances from the terms
of the zoning ordinance; and

D.

Determine the existence, expansion or
modification
of non-conforming
uses.
(Ord. 1221 § l(part), 1993).

1

§ 19.92.030 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1.

13

Based on this Ordinance, the lower court erroneously concluded
the Board of Adjustment could resolve the vested rights issue
pursuant to its authority to grant a variance; pursuant to its
authority to consider non-conforming uses; or pursuant to its
authority

to hear and decide

appeals from

zoning decisions.

(R195-196)
A careful analysis of each of those conclusions demonstrates
the Court was in error.

The Board of Adjustment cannot deal with

vested rights issues implicit in conditional use applications under
the Salt Lake County Ordinances.
A.

The Board of Adjustment is Prohibited, Both by Statute
and Ordinances, From Granting a Use Variance.

Under Utah law, the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment has
no authority to grant a use variance. That is expressly prohibited
by statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707 (5)2 provides:

The board of adjustment and any other body may
not grant a use variance.
(Emphasis added).

The ordinances of Salt Lake County also provide

that "the board of adjustment and any other body may not grant a
use variance." Salt Lake County zoning ordinances § 19.92.040(E),
emphasis added.
The controlling, undisputed facts of this case are that the
subject property was down-zoned in March of 1994, and the use of
the property

was changed

from

an A-l

zone, which permitted

condominium P.U.D.s as a conditional use (such as Stonebridge was

§ 17-27-707 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1.

14

developing), to an R-l-15 zone, which is a single family residential zone requiring one-third acre lots per residential structure,
which does not permit the P.U.D. conditional use.

Because the

down-zoning changed the property's permitted use, the Board of
Adjustment cannot alter that use by granting a variance.

That

would constitute a prohibited use variance.
The lower court's ruling runs directly contrary to that
controlling law.

Consequently, the Board of Adjustment has no

authority to resolve the subject vested rights issue by granting a
use variance.
B.

A Non-conforming Use is Not the Same Thing as a Vested
Right.

The Court also erred in its ruling that the concept of a
"vested right" is the same thing as a "non-conforming" use, and
consequently can be resolved by the Board of Adjustment under its
authority to deal with non-conforming uses. The express, controlling statutory provisions and ordinances indicate the opposite is
true.
In this State, both by statute and ordinance, the concepts of
vested rights and non-conforming uses are different, and distinct.
They are not interchangeable expressions of the same concept. The
Board of Adjustment has been given authority to determine the
existence of "non-conforming uses," but it has never been given
authority to determine the existence of "vested rights." The lower
court's ruling overlooks those critical —
facts.

15

even dispositive —

By statute, the State of Utah defines a non-conforming use in
a manner that is inconsistent with and different from a vested
right.

The statutory definition explains:
"Non-conforming use" means a use of land that:
(i)

legally existed before
zoning designation;

its current

(ii)

has been maintained continuously since
the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed; and

(iii)

because of subsequent zoning changes,
it does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(1) (emphasis added).
The zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, Section 19.04.385
define a "non-conforming use" in a similar fashion—inconsistent
with the concept of vested rights presented by this case.
"Non-conforming use" means a use which lawfully occupied a building or land at the time the
ordinance codified in this title became effective and which does not conform with the use
regulations of the zone in which it is located.
The Ordinances of Salt Lake County, Section 19.04.3853, (emphasis
added).
By statutory definition, a non-conforming use is a preexisting use to which land has actually and continually been placed
before a change in the zoning ordinance. The Board of Adjustment's
authority with respect to non-conforming uses is limited accordingly.

3

§ 19.04.385 is reproduced in full in the Appendix, Tab 1.
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In striking contrast, the concept of vested rights presented
by this case does not deal with a pre-existing use.

Instead, it

focuses on the proposed future development of land for a new and
different use.
[A development application] is entitled to
favorable action if the application conforms
to the zoning ordinance in effect at the time
of the application, and unless changes in the
zoning ordinance are pending which would
prohibit the use of applied for . . . .
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan. 617 P.2d 388, 391
(Utah 1980).
The distinct differences between a "non-conforming use" and a
"vested right" is graphically demonstrated by the following chart:

1

NON-CONFORMING USE

VESTED RIGHT

The concept of non-conforming
use is a creature of statue and
ordinance.

1

Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, Section 19.04.385.

In contrast, the concept of a
vested right is a judicially
created common-law doctrine.
It was adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court, independent of
and without reference to, the
concept of non-conforming
use.
1

The non-conforming use concept
is limited to a pre-existing
use that continuously and lawfully occupied a building or
land before a change in the
zoning ordinance.

The vested rights concept is
not the continuation of a
prior use of land. Instead,
it applies to a proposed different and new use of the
land.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103.

It focuses on the perpetuation
of a pre-existing use that ac1 tually occupied the land.
In evaluating a non-conforming
use, the focus is on the prior
use before a change in zoning
ordinance.

In a vested rights analysis,
the focus is not on a prior
use, but the date a development application is filed for
a change in the prior use.
|
17

A non-conforming use is abandoned if the continuous use is
interrupted for a period of
sixty days during any twelvemonth period.

In contrast, there is no similar abandonment element for
determining whether a vested
right exists,
|

Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake
I County, § 19.08.130.

|
J

In this State, the concepts of vested rights and non-conforming uses are distinct and different.

The lower court did not

consider or discuss the Utah law on this issue, relying instead on
two cases, one from Connecticut and one from Oregon (R196), where
the law is different, and the concepts of vested rights and nonconforming uses are used interchangeably.4
Under the law of this State, the lower court's ruling is a
non-sequitur.

A non-conforming use is not the same thing as a

vested right.

They are apples and oranges.

The Board of Adjust-

ment has never been delegated authority to resolve vested rights
disputes.
Consequently, the lower court erred in ruling that vested
rights and non-conforming use issues are synonymous, entitling the
Board of Adjustment to decide vested rights issues.
C.

There Was no Appeal That Could Be Taken to the Board of
Adjustment,

The lower court also concluded that the zoning decision should
have been appealed to the Board of Adjustment.

But again, that

Petrazzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, etc., 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn.
1979); Clackamas County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973).
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decision is erroneous, directly inconsistent with the controlling
ordinances.
The application Stonebridge filed with Salt Lake County for
the development of the next phase of its P.U.D. approved by Salt
Lake

County

in

1981 was

a conditional

use

application.

The

ordinances of Salt Lake County expressly provide that appeals to
the Board

of Adjustment

decisions.

cannot be brought

on conditional use

Salt Lake County Ordinances, Section

19.92.050(C)5

provides:
1.

Only zoning decisions applying the ordinance may be appealed to the Board of
Adjustment.

2.

A person may not appeal, and the board of
adjustment may not consider, any zoning
ordinance amendments or conditional use
decisions.

That ordinance conclusively disposes of the issue. Conditional use
applications cannot be appealed to or considered by the Board of
Adjustment. The Court's reliance is misplaced in any event because
this action does not involve an appeal from the application
zoning ordinance. No zoning ordinance has been applied.

of a

Salt Lake

County punted, indicating the vested rights issue must be resolved
before it would consider Stonebridge's conditional use application.
The possibility of appeal to the Board of Adjustment is also
flatly foreclosed by § 19.92.050(D)6 of the Zoning Ordinance of

§ 19.92.050 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1.
6

See Footnote 5.
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Salt Lake County.

That Ordinance expressly prohibits appeals to

the Board of Adjustment that seek to waive or modify the terms or
requirements of a zoning ordinance:
D.

Appeals [to the Board of Adjustment] may
not be used to waive or modify the terms
or requirements of the zoning ordinance.

The controlling statutes and ordinances clearly demonstrate
the Board of Adjustment has no authority to resolve vested rights
issues.
POINT II.
DECLARATORY RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE
UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED BY THIS CASE.
The procedural posture of this case is unique.

Without a

declaratory judgment resolving the vested rights issue, or at least
determining

who

can

resolve

it,

this

matter

will

remain

in

perpetual limbo.
Neither the Salt Lake County Planning Commission nor the Board
of County Commissioners has passed on the merits of Stonebridge's
Conditional Use application.

Instead, they refused to consider the

merits of the application until the issue of vested rights is
determined.

At the time of the hearing before the Salt Lake County

Planning Commission, the Planning Commission Chairman explained:
The Planning Commission is not a court of law,
and we cannot make a decision until the vested
right issue is resolved.

We are not going to want to consider this
until this vested rights issue is resolved.
It is not up to us to resolve it. It has to
be resolved outside of this body.
20

I don't think we can do that [pass on the
pending application] until the vested right
issue is resolved to whether or not it is a
legitimate application.
(R128).

A copy of the official Minutes of the Salt Lake Planning

Commission, dated October 25, 1994, is attached to the Appendix as
Tab 2.

The fact t h a t the County did not reach or consider the merits
of

the

Stonebridge

November 9,

application

1994 l e t t e r

to

is

further

Stonebridge,

Planning Commission denied the request

evidenced

indicating

the

by

its

County

"on the b a s i s t h a t

it

d o e s n ' t have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o determine whether t h e r e i s a vested
r i g h t for t h i s project. 1 1
Appendix as Tab 3.

A copy of t h i s l e t t e r i s included in the

The S a l t Lake County Commission affirmed t h a t

action without hearing.
Consequently, t h i s i s not an "appeal" t o review the substant i v e merits of the decision of the Planning Commission or Board of
County Commissioners. 7

Stonebridge has never been permitted t o

present the merits of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n .

Neither did the Planning

Commission or the S a l t Lake County Commission ever reach the merits

7

The lower c o u r t concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f had t h i r t y (30) days from t h e
County Commission's December 7, 1994 Decision t o appeal t h e d e c i s i o n t o t h e
D i s t r i c t Court. However, S t o n e b r i d g e ' s a c t i o n was not brought by way of appeal
t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e a c t i o n of t h e Planning Commission and County
Commission. The r u l e r e g a r d i n g " a p p e a l s " from County A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Hearings t o
t h e D i s t r i c t Court a p p l i e s only if a person a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by a d e c i s i o n a t
t h e County A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Hearing d e s i r e s "review of t h e d e c i s i o n " with t h e
D i s t r i c t Court. But t h a t has no a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . S t o n e b r i d g e has not
p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court for review of t h a t d e c i s i o n . S t o n e b r i d g e seeks d e c l a r a t o r y
judgment t h a t i t has v e s t e d r i g h t s , or a t t h e very l e a s t a d e c i s i o n of who can
determine whether i t has v e s t e d r i g h t s . N e i t h e r of t h o s e i s s u e s was addressed
by t h e Planning Commission or County Commission.
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of the development

application.

Neither body

considered

or

determined whether vested rights existed. They refused to hear and
consider that issue, demanding resolution of the vested rights
issue before they would consider the conditional use applications.
A declaratory judgment action was brought to obtain the vested
rights determination

the County

requested

as a predicate to

considering the development application of Stonebridge.

Until a

declaratory judgment is obtained determining whether vested rights
exist, or at the very least resolving who can determine whether
vested rights exist, Stonebridge is placed in an untenable quandary
that can never be resolved.

The Salt Lake County Planning

Commission has refused to determine whether Stonebridge has vested
rights, claiming that it has no jurisdiction or authority to do so.
The County Commission affirmed without comment or hearing.

The

lower court has refused to pass on the issue, and the Board of
Adjustment does not have authority to pass on the issue.
Even if Stonebridge resorted to the Board of Adjustment, that
would not resolve the problem.

Any decision by the Board of

Adjustment would be subject to attack and dispute from community
residents or others because, as discussed in Point I above, the
Board of Adjustment has no authority to resolve vested rights
issues.
A very real and genuine dispute exists concerning whether
vested rights exist and who can resolve the vested rights issue
presented by this case.

Stonebridge is entitled to declaratory

relief resolving the vested rights issue, or determining who can.
22

It is also important to note that several of the causes of
action of Stonebridge's Complaint are unrelated
rights issue in any event.

to the vested

They involve issues of the constitu-

tional taking of plaintiff's property without just compensation in
violation of Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and whether the zoning ordinances preventing
development of plaintiff's property are unconstitutional if applied
to prevent development of plaintiff's property, and, if so, whether
taking of plaintiff's property has occurred without the payment of
just compensation, etc.
None of the claims of the Complaint are an appeal from any
action taken by the Planning Commission or County Commission.
POINT III.
STONEBRIDGE CAREFULLY EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
The

lower court's determination

that

Stonebridge did

not

exhaust available administrative remedies (R196) is also error. To
the contrary, Stonebridge conscientiously and carefully satisfied
any such requirement.
Although

Stonebridge

believes

that

the

determination

of

whether it has vested rights is a legal decision that can be
decided by the courts, it did not begin its odyssey by filing a
complaint in district court.

Instead, out of an abundance of

caution and in an effort to extinguish any defense that Stonebridge
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, it took the issue to
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the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, and thereafter appealed
the issue to the Board of County Commissioners.
The lower court concluded the administrative procedures should
have gone through the Board of Adjustment.

But the County

Ordinances mandate the course pursued by Stonebridge.
The development of the subject property is by conditional use
permit.

The Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances provide that the

Planning Commission is the body required to pass on conditional use
permits.

Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances, Section 19.05.040:8
The planning commission shall: . . . approve
or deny conditional use permits; . . . .

(Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the ordinances provide that all appeals from the
Planning Commission's conditional use decision shall go to the
County Commission.
Any person shall have the right to appeal to
the board of county commissioners any [conditional use] decision rendered by the Planning
Commission . . . .
Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances, Section 19.84.1109
Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P. 2d 440

See also

(Utah 1981) (the Utah

Supreme Court expressly approved appeals of conditional use permits
from a County Planning Commission to the County Commissioners and
not to the Board of Adjustment).

§ 19.05.040 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1.
9

§ 19.84.110 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1.
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Furthermore, the ordinances of Salt Lake County clearly
instruct that the Board of Adjustment cannot consider conditional
use permits.

lf

conditional

use

[T]he board of adjustment may not consider any . . .
decisions."

Salt

Lake

County

Ordinances,

§ 19.92.050(C).
Therefore, as required by ordinance, Stonebridge brought its
conditional

use

application

to

the

appealed it to the County Commission.

Planning

Commission, and

Indeed, the County sent

Stonebridge a notice directing that any appeal should go to the
County Commission.

A copy of that notice is attached to the

Appendix as Tab 4.
The inescapable fact is that Stonebridge went to great lengths
to insure that any administrative remedies were exhausted.

For

over seven (7) months Salt Lake County refused to take action on
plaintiff's pending application for final development approval of
the subject property.

Stonebridge complained that the County was

stonewalling, and indicated it wanted the County to consider the
application before litigation commenced, to eliminate any defense
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
pressing

the County

for nearly

Ultimately, after

a year, the County Planning

Commission and County Commission finally considered the issue, at
plaintiff's

request, exhausting

any

applicable

administrative

remedies.
The matter was not brought before the Board of Adjustment
because that body does not have authority to deal with conditional
use applications, and the vested rights issues inherent therein.
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See Point I hereof.

Pursuing an application before a board that

has no authority to hear it, or grant it, is certainly not required
by even the most liberal application of the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine. Indeed, any requisite administrative remedies would not
have been exhausted had Stonebridge pursued the issue before the
Board of Adjustment.
POINT IV.
THIS ACTION FULLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS
OF RIPENESS AND FINALITY,
The lower court's determination that the doctrines of ripeness
and finality require dismissal of the Complaint is also error.
(R200-201) As set forth in Point III above, Stonebridge fully and
conscientiously exhausted any applicable administrative remedies.
The lower court decision suggests that Stonebridge should have
"applied for variances to the R-l-15 zoning" before any action by
the County could become final. But as discussed above, that would
constitute an application for a use variance. Under Utah law, Salt
Lake County has no authority to grant a use variance.10 The recent
down-zoning

of the property by Salt Lake County changed the

permitted use.

Consequently, a different use cannot be permitted

by variance.
Under such circumstances, failing to request a use variance
does not present ripeness or finality problems.

To the contrary,

the case law uniformly holds that where a variance is not available

"The Board of Adjustment and any other body may not grant a use
variance." (emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707(5); Salt Lake County
Zoning Ordinances, Section 19.92.40(e).
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under local law there is no requirement to pursue a variance.
Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster. 881 F.2d 1570, 1575 (11th
Cir. 1989) (holding that a taking claim is ripe where "there are no
variances

available

under

the

applicable

local

Herrinqton v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488

law").

See

(9th Cir. 1987),

amended in part. 857 F.2d 567 (1988) (application for a variance
need not be made if it would be futile).
In any event, the lower court's ruling overlooks the clear
application of the "futility" rule under the circumstances.
law

is well

settled

that

pursuing

administrative

remedies

finality is not required if it would be a futile act.
Circuit

held

that

the

"act

of

re-zoning

is the

The
to

The Ninth

strongest

as

possible, if not irrefutable indication that the County is opposed"
more intense development of property.
Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 535
property

is

down-zoned

Hoehne v. County of San

(9th Cir. 1989).

to

prevent

more

Consequently, when
intense

development,

pursuing the futility of administrative hearings requesting more
intense development is futile and not required.
In

this

case,

down-zoning

the

subject

property

is

the

strongest, most irrefutable evidence of the futility of pursuing
any administrative remedies to permit the planned development of
the

property,

which

is

not

permitted

under

the

new

zoning.

Consequently, the act of down-zoning the subject property satisfies
any finality requirement with respect to the use of that property.
Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d

1071, 1073 cert.

denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah App. 1992) ("the law does not require
27

the exhaustion of administrative remedies when it would serve no
useful purpose11); Herrinaton v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); State Department of
Taxation v. Scotsman Mfg. , 849 P.2d 317, 319 (Nev. 1993) (the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply where
administrative proceedings would be futile); City of Bellevue v.
Kravir (Wash. App. 1993) (exhaustion of remedies does not apply
where it would be futile).
CONCLUSION
The lower court's decision is wrong as a matter of law.
overlooks or misconstrues the controlling —

even dispositive

It
—

statutes of this State and ordinances of Salt Lake County.
The Board of Adjustment is not authorized to resolve vested
rights decisions.

That is either a matter for the Planning

Commission/County Commission, where the matter was pursued by
Stonebridge, or for the courts. Any administrative remedies were
fully exhausted, and the doctrine of finality and ripeness is
plainly satisfied.
Under the circumstances, the decision of the lower court
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

KEVIN EGAR AWbERSON
'"
"^
/ of and for
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
November 11, 1996
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APPENDIX
Tab 1:

Statutes and Ordinances cited in the Brief.

Tab 2:

Official Minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission, October 25, 1994 Hearing concerning the
Stonebridge Conditional Use Application.

Tab 3:

Notice of Action on the Stonebridge Conditional Use
Application.

Tab 4:

Notice from Salt Lake County directing any appeal of the
Planning Commission Decision to the County Commissioners.

Tab 5:

Memorandum Decision of
Stonebridge's Complaint.

Tab 6:

Order of the Court dismissing Stonebridge's Complaint by
Summary Judgment.

the

lower

court

dismissing

Tabl

Utah Code Annotated
5 17-27-103(1) Definitions
(1)

"Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i)

legally existed before its current zoning designation;

(ii)

has been maintained continuously since the time the
zoning regulation governing the land changed; and

(iii)

because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform
with the zoning regulations that now govern the land.

Utah Code Annotated
§ 17-27-707 Variances
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of
the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of
property that he owns, leases, or in which he holds some other
beneficial interest may apply to the board of adjustment for a
variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance.
(2)

(a)

The board of adjustment may grant a variance only
if:

(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would
cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is
not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the
zoning ordinance;
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the
property that do not generally apply to other properties
in the same district;
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the
enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by
other property in the same district;
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the
general plan and will not be contrary to the public
interest; and
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed
and substantial justice done.
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of
the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship
under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment may not
find an unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship:
(A) is located on or associated with the
property for which the variance is sought; and
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the
property, not from conditions that are general to
the neighborhood.
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of the
zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under
Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find
an unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed
or economic.

(c) In determining whether or not there are special
circumstances attached to the property under Subsection
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may find that special circumstances exist only if the special circumstances:
(i)

relate to the hardship complained of; and

(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to
other properties in the same district.
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all
of the conditions justifying a variance have been met.
(4)

Variances run with the land.

(5) The board of adjustment and any other body may not grant
use variances.
(6) In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may
impose additional requirements on the applicant that will:
(a)

mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or

(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement
that is waived or modified.

ZONING ORDINANCE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.04.385

Nonconforming use.

"Nonconforming use" means a use which lawfully occupied a
building or land at the time the ordinance codified in this title
became effective and which does not conform with the use regulations of the zone in which it is located.
(Prior code § 22-16(50))

ZONING ORDINANCE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
S 19.05.040

Powers and duties.

The planning commission shall:
A.
Prepare and recommend a master plan and amendments to the
master plan to the board of county commissioners;
B.
Recommend zoning ordinances and maps and amendment to
zoning ordinances and maps tot he board of county commissioners;
C.
Recommend subdivision ordinances and amendment to those
ordinances to the board of county commissioners;
D.
Recommend approval or denial of subdivision applications
to the board of county commissioners;
E.

Approve or deny conditional use permits;

F.
Advise the board of county commissioners on matters that
the board of county commissioners directs;
G.
Provide other functions as specified in this chapter or
as directed by the board of county commissioners. (Ord. 1220 § 1
(part), 1993)

ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.84.110

Appeal of planning commission decision.

A.
Any person shall have the right to appeal to the board of
county commissioners any decision rendered by the planning
commission by filing in writing, and in triplicate, stating the
reasons for the appeal with the board of county commissioners
within ten days following the date upon which the decision is made
by the planning commission. After receiving the appeal the county
commission may reaffirm the planning commission decision, remand
the matter to the planning commission for further consideration, or
set a date for a public hearing.
B.
Notification of Planning Commission. The board of county
commissioners shall notify planning commission of the date of the
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding the date set for
hearing so that the planning commission may prepare the record for
the hearing.
B.
Determination by Board of County Commissioners.
The
board of county commissioners after proper review of the decision
of the planning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for
further review and consideration any action taken by the planning
commission. (Ord. 1004 § 2, 1987: prior code § 22-31-2(6))

ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.88.080

Nonconforming use of land.

The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this title
became effective, may be continued provided that no such nonconforming use of land shall in any way be expanded or extended either
on the same or adjoining property, and provided that if such
nonconforming use of land, or any portion thereof, is abandoned or
changed for a period of one year or more, any future use of such
land shall be in conformity with the provision of this title.
(Prior code § 22-4-11)

ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.88.130

Abandonment.

A nonconforming use shall be deemed abandoned if the use has
not applied to the premises for a consecutive period of sixty days
during any twelve-month period, (Ord. 1207 § 2, 1992; prior code
§ 22-4-12)

ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.92.040 Variances.
A. Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of
the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of
property that he/she owns, leases, or in which he/she holds some
other beneficial interest may apply to the board of adjustment for
a variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance.
B.

1.

The board of adjustment may grant a variance only if:

a. Literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would
cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is
not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the
zoning ordinance;
b. There are special circumstances attached to the
property that do not generally apply to other properties in
the same district;
c. Granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment
of a substantial property right possessed by other property
in the same district;
d. The variance will not substantially affect the
general plan and will not be contrary to the public
interest; and
e. The spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and
substantial just done.
2. a. In determining whether or not enforcement of the
zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under
subsection (B) (1) , the board of adjustment may not find an
unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship:
(i) Is located on or associated with the property
for which the variance is sought; and
(ii) Comes from circumstances peculiar to the
property, not from conditions that are general to the
neighborhood.
b. In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning
ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under subsection (B)(1), 1, the board of adjustment may not find an
unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or
economic.
3. In determining whether or not there are special
circumstances attached to the property under subsection (B) (1) ,

the board of adjustment may find that special circumstances
exist only if the special circumstances:
a.

Relate to the hardship complained of; and

b. Deprive the property of privileges granted to other
properties in the same district.
C. The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of
the conditions justify a variance have been met.
D.

Variances run with the land.

E. The board of adjustment and any other body may not grant
use variances.
F. In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may impose
additional requirement on the applicant that will:
1.

Mitigate any harmful effects of the variance; or

2. Serve the purpose of the standard or requirement that
is waived or modified. (Ord. 1221 § 1 (part), 1993)

ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.92.050

Appeals.

A. 1. The applicant or any other person or entity adversely
affected by a zoning decision administering or interpreting a
zoning ordinance may appeal that decision applying the zoning
ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order,
requirement, decision or determination made by an official in
the administration or interpretation of the zoning ordinance•
2. Any officer, department, board or bureau of a county
affected by the grant or refusal of a building permit or by any
other decisions of the administrative officer in the administration or interpretation of the zoning ordinance may appeal
any decision to the board of adjustment.
B. The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of
proving that an error has been made.
C. 1. Only zoning decisions applying the ordinance may be
appealed to the board of adjustment.
2. A person may not appeal, and the board of adjustment
may not consider, any zoning ordinance amendment or conditional
use decisions.
D. Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or
requirements of the zoning ordinance.
E. An appeal to the board of adjustment must be filed at the
development services division of Salt Lake County within sixty days
after the order, requirement decision or determination administering or interpreting the zoning ordinance is made in writing. The
appeal shall set forth with specificity the reasons or grounds for
the appeal.
F. Appeals shall follow the procedures set forth in the rules
of the board of adjustment. (Ord. 1221 § 1 (part), 1993)

ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
§ 19.92.030

Powers and Duties.

The board of adjustment shall:
A. Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions applying the
zoning ordinance as provided in Section 19•92.050;
B. Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms of the
zoning ordinance set forth in Section 19.92.060;
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms of the zoning
ordinance; and
D. Determine the existence, expansion or modification of
nonconforming uses. (Ord. 1221 § 1 (part), 1993).
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PLAN.-iNG COMMISSION
OCTOBER 2 5 , 1 9 9 4

materials and roofs comes about because we have seen some storage units that ended up with red roofs anc
blue doors. This one would weather to a gray.
By motion seconded, the Planning Commission approved this application with staff recommendations,
including the latitude for the roofing material as outlined by the applicant.
PL-94-2223 - THE CHILDREN & TEEN PREGNANCY FOUNDATION - 7046 S. 700 E. - PUBLIC/QUASI-PUBLIC
USE (HOUSING FOR TEENAGE UNWED MOTHERS) - R-2-10 ZONE - UNION
The applicant has requested the application be continued to the meeting of 12/13/94.
By motion seconded, the Planning Commission continued this application to the meeting of Decembe
13, 1994, at the request of the applicant.
PL-94-3004 - STONEBRIDGE LAND HOLDING CO. - 9750 S. 4000 E. - DWELLING GROUP (16 UNITS) - A-'
ZONE - GRANITE
Bill Marsh - The applicant is a proposal for an phase in the Stonebridge Condominiums. The applicant i:
proposing to add 1 6 additional units located on south side. Staff recommends that the Planning Commissioi
hear the information from both sides and continue the application for two weeks so that you can consider th
information then field trip the site.
Jack Grace - 4085 E. Cory Drive - Vice President of the Stonebridge Land Holding Company - I've been involve*
in this project since 1986. We decided to go into a first phase for the property, allowing for a 19 lot P.U.C
off of Alta Approach Road. We are asking for an in fill of a piece of property which is surrounded on both side
by development. On one side is the 1 -1 condominiums and the other side the 19 lot P.U.D. We wanted to hav
someone speak as to our vested right.
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - The Planning Commission is not a court of law,
and can not make a decision until the vested right issue is resolved.
Kent Lewis - County Deputy Attorney - I told them they could make a brief presentation.
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - We are not going to want to consider this until this vested rig*
issue is resolve. It is not up to us to resolve it. It has to be resolved outside of this body.
Jack Grace - Then we are just asking for a decision by your body to whether you are approving our plan or noi
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - I don't think we can do that until the vested right issue
resolved to whether or not it is a legitimate application. Will the vested right issue be resolved in two week:
Kevin Anderson - 201 S. Main Street #1300 - There is a doctrine in the law called exhaustion of administrate
remedies which requires that before a party resort to the courts, it must first exhaust all of its administrate
remedies. Meaning going to the Planning Commission, County Commission and attempting to obtain permissk
so that if possible legal action in the courts could be avoided. It is possible that the vested rights issue can i
resolved by stipulation or agreement with the County Attorney's office and that is why they wanted us to mai
this presentation.
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - Why are we hearing this.
Kent Lewis - County Deputy Attorney - They have to exhaust their administrative remedies. I don't know
I agree that this is the appropriate body to exhaust them before. I would like to have a brief explanation. The
may be some compromises between what can be done under the original approval and what can be done unc
the new ordinance. So I wanted you to at least have a flavor as to what their original claim is and what th
are proposing because you are going to have to be involved in any compromise if there is to be one.
m

S A L T LAKE C O U N T Y PLANNING C O M M I S S I O N
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Kevin Anderson - Once we acquire vested rights to use our property for a particular purpose, subsequer
changes in zoning laws or land use laws cannot prevent that use. An application for subdivision approval
entitled to favorable action if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in affect at the time of tn
application. An application was filed and approved in 1980 for 75 units, on the entire 29.5 acre parcel as
P.U.D. It was also approved to pursue that development in phases. When that was finished the next pare
of this development began. That involved an amendment to the existing P.U.D., it included about 1 5 acres <
the property and 19 single family lots were approved, recorded, developed and sold. That left in the cent*
of the property a couple of pieces. On the heals of the end of that second phase, another phase began, Th
w a s construction of the pool complex. That left 4.1 acres in the middle of the property, which had rt
intention of being developed as P.U.D. condominiums. That is the application that is before you today.
Richard Young - Granite Community Council - The history of the entire development began in 1980. In M<
of 1 9 8 2 approval was given for 11 units, but the Granite Community Council did not approve 69 units. Tr
master plan shows single family dwellings on 1/2 acre lots and no commercial development except for the i
Caille Restaurant. Other developers have cooperated to keep the area consistent. There is no approval for xt
application. They withdrew their residential application and have instead come back w i t h this 16 ur
application. The applicant is actively pursuing ski rental ventures w i t h advertisements in ski magazines. I a;
the Planning Commission to field trip the site preferably on a weekend afternoon and to take the grade ar
incline into consideration. The contrast between the 11 units and the rest of the neighborhood was a sta
contrast. The developer needs to cooperate w i t h the neighborhood. They should develop but within tl
parameters of the Hillside Ordinance and the master plan.
Tom Haywall - 3 9 1 6 E. Alta Approach - Read a letter by his homeowners association into the record. Thn
owners support this application. Nine of the owners do not support this application and ask that i
development be allowed that does not conform to the Granite Community Master Plan and the Hillsif
Ordinance.
By motion seconded, the Planning Commission continued this application to the meeting of Novemb
8, 1 9 9 4 , to be on for decision only.
Kent Lewis - County Deputy Attorney - If there is not a vested right the Planning Commission would have
jurisdiction to approve the proposal because it doesn't comply w i t h the present zoning. If there is a vest
right, since they only had a preliminary approval and this is not the identical application, the Planni
Commission would still have to hear it and approve this site plan. There is also a vested rights agreemc
where w e compromise the matter and enter into a contract giving them a vested right to something less th
they claim but more than they can do under the present ordinance. That is what we are working out with t
adjoining piece of property. Any kind of agreement like that would come back the Planning Commission
review.
PL-94-2235 - KENNETH 0 . MELBY - 4 7 1 1 & 4 7 2 5 S. HOLLADAY BLVD. (2275 E.) - 2 STORY OFFI
BUILDING - C-2 ZONE - HOLL/COTT
John Young - The applicant is proposing to remove an old grocery store and service station to construct a t
story office building.
Staff recommends approval subject to the following:
1.
Meet w i t h the staff for review and final approval of the site plan.
2.
Receive and agree to the recommendations from other agencies, i.e.; Fire Department, City-Coui
Health Dept., Urban Hydrology, etc.
3.
Dedication of 4 0 ' from center line of Holladay Blvd. to Salt Lake County for street right-of-way.
4.
Submit three copies of a planting and sprinkling plan showing types, sizes and placement of pi
material to the staff for review and approval. This plan should save the existing trees where possii
5.
Install curb, gutter and sidewalk on all public streets at the correct alignment.
6.
No signs are approved with this request, they require separate approval.
7.
Install a 6' high solid visual barrier wood fence or masonry wall around the north & east property li
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November 9, 1994
S U I T LUKE COUNTY

Salt Lake County
Public Works
Department

STONEBRIDGE LANDHOLDING CO.
3 3 0 9 FAIRMONT DRIVE
NASHVILLE TN 84092

Development Servic
Division
Randy Horiuchi
Salt Lake County
Commissioner

RE:

PL-94-3004 - A Dwelling Group (16 Units) at 9 7 5 0 S. 4 0 0 0 E.

Lonnie L. Johnson
Director of Public Works
Ken Jones
Division Director

On November 8, 1994, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission denied
this request on the basis that it doesn't have jurisdiction to determine
whether there is a vested right for this project.

SALT LAKE COUNTY
GOVERNMENT CENTEr
2001 S. State Street
Suite N3600
Salt Lake City
Utah 84190-4050

Respectfully,

Tel (801)468-2000

^A.£
William A. Marsh
Section Manager
WAM/tf
Enc: Appeal Policy
pc:

Granite
Business License
Sandy Sullivan/Danny Vranes
9 7 6 4 S. Little Cottonwood Place
Sandy UT 84092
Kevin Anderson
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Uta Center, 13th Floor
201 S. Main Street
SLC UT 84111-2215

TDD (801) 468-2877
Fax (801)468-2169
Printed on Recycled Paper
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SALT LAKE COUNTY
ZONING ORDINANCE

! 19.84.110 Appeal of Planning Commission Decision
A. Any person shall have the right to appeal to the Board of
County Commissioners any decision rendered by the Planning
Commission by filing in writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons
for the appeal with the Board of County Commissioners within ten
days following the date upon which the decision is made by the
Planning Commission. After receiving the appeal the County
Commission may reaffirm the Planning Commission Decision,
remand the matter to the Planning Commission for further
consideration, or set a date for a public hearing.
B. Notification of Planning Commission. The Board of County
Commissioners shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of
the review, in writing, at least seven days preceding the date set for
hearing so that the Planning Commission may prepare the record for
the hearing.
C.
Determination by Board of County Commissioners. The Board
of County Commissioners after proper review of the decision of the
Planning Commission may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further
review and consideration any action taken by the Planning
Commission. (Ord. 1004 § 2, 19S7: prior code § 22-31-2(6))

Salt Lake County Commission
2 0 0 1 South State Street, Suite IM2100
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 9 0 - 1 0 0 0
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AUG i n
By
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

ST0NEBRID6E LAND HOLDING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 950900959

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah; THE BOARD OP
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OP SALT
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI;
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERSON;
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10;
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
defendants71 "Motion to Dismiss" plaintiff's2 Complaint. Plaintiff
opposed this motion. On June 19, 1995, the parties, through their
respective counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Kevin Egan Anderson
in behalf of plaintiff, and Kent S. Lewis, Deputy County Attorney,
in behalf of defendants, presented oral argument to the Court. At

defendants in this matter are Salt Lake County, the Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, Randy Horiuchi, Mary
Callahan, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Planning Commission and
John Does 1-10. Collectively they are referred to as "defendants."
2

Plaintiff is Stonebridge Land Holding Company and is hereafter
referred to as "plaintiff" or "Stonebridge."
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the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under
advisement•
The Court has now carefully considered the Motion, Memoranda
and Affidavit and other documents submitted by the parties, and the
arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, and for good cause
shown, the Court hereby enters the following ruling.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds
it fails to state a cause upon which relief can be granted and that
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

More

particularly, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies and that the matter is not ripe for
adjudication.

Defendants

further

contend

that

the

Planning

Commission properly refused to consider Stonebridge's conditional
use application on the grounds that (1) the Board of Adjustments
and not the Salt Lake County Planning Commission had authority to
decide the vested rights issue; (2) Stonebridge failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies by refusing to request the Board of
Adjustments

to

consider

its

claims;

and

(3)

Stonebridge's

constitutional taking claim is not ripe for adjudication because
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County
as to what it will be allowed to construct.

STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY
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This Motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion is that it must be "apparent that under no set of facts
proven in support of the claim as pleaded would [Stonebridge] be
entitled to relief."

Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olsen, Inc., 815 P.2d

1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991).
In this case, defendants submitted an affidavit in support of
their Motion, and both parties produced other evidence for the
Court to consider.

Accordingly, this Motion may be treated as a

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

The standard for summary

judgment is that there may be no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The non-moving party is
entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence presented to the Court.3
The central issue in this case revolves around who, among the
defendants, if anyone, has the authority to determine whether a
particular

interest claimed constitutes a "vested right" and

whether a "vested right" should be considered the same as or at

Notwithstanding the fact defendants submitted the Affidavit
and both parties produced other evidence to the Court, the parties
have approached this motion as a motion to dismiss and not as a
motion for summary judgment.

STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY
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The material facts in

this case are not in dispute, they are set forth fully in the
pleadings.

I.
Pursuant to Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of
Ordinances, 1986, the Board of Adjustment has the power to
A.
Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in Section
19.92.050;
B.
Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms
of the zoning ordinances set forth in Section 19.92.060;
C.
Hear and decide variances from the terms of the
zoning ordinance; and
D.
Determine the existence, expansion or modification
of nonconforming use.
Under Section 19.92.030 plaintiff could have (1) appealed to
the Board of Adjustment under subsection A when the Development
Services Division refused to acknowledge plaintiff's vested rights
claim; (2) applied to the Board of Adjustment under subsection C
for variances to the current R-l-15 zoning; or (3) applied to the
Board of Adjustment under subsection D claiming it has a vested
right to nonconforming use status.
Instead of pursuing its claim before the Board of Adjustment,
plaintiff proceeded to file its Complaint in district court.
Pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(1) Utah Code Ann. (1991), M[n]o
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person may challenge in district court a county's

land use

decisions made under this chapter or under regulation made under
authority

of

this

chapter

until

they

have

exhausted

their

administrative remedies.ff
Plaintiff claims that the Board of Adjustment does not have
jurisdiction to consider

its claim because plaintiff's

claim

concerns a claimed vested right as opposed to a nonconforming use
and that no ordinance or other law authorizes the Board of
Adjustment to determine the existence of "vested rights."
However, Section 19.92.030 clearly authorizes the Board, among
other things, to determine the existence of "nonconforming uses."
The concepts of "vested rights" and "nonconforming uses" have been
used interchangeably in other jurisdictions to refer to partially
completed developments as well as fully completed developments.
Petrazzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, etc., 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn.
1979); Clackamas County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973)4.
Based on the foregoing and the other arguments set forth by
defendants,

because

plaintiff

failed

to

have

the

Board

of

Adjustment decide plaintiff's issues, plaintiff's first and second
causes of action are dismissed.

4

See,
also,
the
discussion
regarding
vested
rights/nonconforming uses in Section II and other arguments set
forth by defendants.
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II.
Plaintiff presented its cause to the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission and the Salt Lake County Commission notwithstanding
their determination that plaintiff should proceed before the Board
of Adjustments.

As such, plaintiff ignored its requirement to

exhaust its administrative remedies and then ignored its obligation
to comply with Section 17-27-1001 Utah Code Ann. (1991) ,5 which
requires a petition for review of the decision below be filed
timely with the district court; namely:

within 3 0 days after the

local decision is rendered6.
In

this

Commission's

case

plaintiff

December

had

30

days

7, 1994, decision

to

from

the

file

a petition

appealing the decision with the district court.

County

However, the

Complaint was not filed until February 10, 1995, some 65 days after
the County Commission decision.

5

Section 17-27-1001(2) provides as follows:
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a
petition for review of this decision with the district
court within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
6

Plaintiff argues that it did not have to appear before either
the Planning Commission nor the Zoning Commission. However, this
position is not persuasive. As a matter of law, plaintiff was
required to exhaust its applicable administrative remedies, supra.
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Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional. Burgers v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Peav v, Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah
1980) .
Moreover, pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(3), an appeal to the
district court is limited as follows to
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are
valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the [administrative]
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
The limitations on the court's review of the administrative
decision before set forth in Section 17-27-1001(3) underscore the
importance and necessity of developing a factual record through the
administrative review process.
Stonebridge's argument that "vested rights" issues must be
decided exclusively by the courts because they concern issues of
law is meritless.

Issues regarding vested rights/nonconforming

uses involve determinations both of fact and law.

The clear

administrative scheme of the current statutes is to require the
development of the factual record in the administrative context.
In this process, legal issues are addressed.

There is nothing

unique about "vested rights" as compared to "nonconforming uses" so
far as the necessity of developing the factual record is concerned.
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Similarly, Stonebridge may not ask for a declaratory judgment
when Utah law expressly provides for an appeal of the County
Commissioners' decision to the Court.

Otherwise, as Salt Lake

County notes, a party who failed to file a timely appeal could
avoid the 30-day requirement simply by asking for declaratory
judgment. Therefore, Stonebridge's first two causes of action for
declaratory judgment and estoppel are not properly before the
Court.
Both parties rely on Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283
(Utah App. 1994), to support their respective positions.

In

Stucker. the plaintiff filed an action seeking declaratory judgment
relief, writ of mandamus relief and damages resulting from an
alleged unconstitutional, inverse taking of plaintiff's property.
However, plaintiff's reliance on Stucker in this case is misplaced
because it was filed prior to the enactment of Section 17-27-703
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992), which grants enabling authority for
boards of adjustment to decide nonconforming uses.
Stucker was also decided prior to the enactment of Section 1727-1001 which provides for an appeal to the district court from
planning and county commission land use decisions. The prior code
did not contain similar provisions.

STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY
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Thus, Stucker, like all of the Utah cases on which plaintiff
relies concerning vested rights issues, occurred prior to the
enactment of this legislation.

At the times in which these cases

were filed, boards of adjustment had no authority to determine
nonconforming use issues and there was no appeal process to the
district court from planning and county commission

land use

decisions. Declaratory and Rule 65B actions were the only remedies
available to review land use issues.

Based on the legislation

having become effective in 1991 and 1992 as discussed above,
parties

now

seeking

determinations

concerning

nonconforming

use/vested rights issues must comply with the relevant appeal
process and time requirements.

III.
Finally, Stonebridge may not maintain its takings claim for
compensation under the United States or Utah Constitutions because
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County
as to what it will be allowed to construct.
In this case, as previously discussed, plaintiff should have
applied to the Board of Adjustments to have the vested rights issue
determined and, if necessary, applied for variances to the R-l-15
zoning. Since 1992, Section 17-27-703(2) (Supp. 1992) has enabled
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cities and counties to delegate to their respective boards of
adjustment the authority to decide nonconforming use issues. Prior
to 1992, boards of adjustment had no such power.
which

plaintiff

relies to support

The cases on

its contentions

regarding

ripeness and finality arose prior to the 1992 amendments and do not
involve exhaustion of remedies or ripeness issues.
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that it would be futile
for plaintiff to seek administrative remedies as discussed, supra.
Here, the County Planning Commission has not denied Stonebridge the
right to develop.

Rather, approximately 15 years ago, it granted

preliminary approval to the development.

The Board of Adjustment

has not denied plaintiff's claim to a vested right nor denied
variances to the present ordinance. This is not a case in which a
remedy does not exist.

To the contrary, this is a case in which

the developer has refused to pursue its remedy.
Based on the foregoing, and the other arguments set forth by
defendants, defendants' Motion to Dismiss
entirety.

is granted

in its

STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY

PAGE ELEVEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Counsel for defendants is ordered to prepare a proposed Order
consistent with this ruling.
Dated thisA^d_~.day of August, 1995.

ANNE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this,

day of

August, 1995:

Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
Kevin Egan Anderson
Attorney for Plaintiff
201 S. Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Kent S. Lewis
Deputy County Attorney
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STONEBRIDGE LAND HOLDING

:

ORDER

COMPANY, a Utah corporation/
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 950900959

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah; THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI;
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERSON;
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10;

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
under which relief may be granted and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction came before the Court for hearing on June 19, 1995 at
9:00

a.m.,

the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding; Kevin Egan

Anderson appeared on behalf of plaintiff, Kent Lewis appeared on
behalf of defendants.

The motion was based upon the contention

that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies that
the matter was not ripe for decision.

The Court treated the motion

as a motion for summary judgment because an affidavit was filed by
defendants and other documents were presented to the Court by both
parties.

The Court having considered the pleadings, Memoranda, and
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documents filed by the parties and having rendered a Memorandum
decision granting defendants' motion and stating the grounds for
such decision,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

Summary Judgment

is granted in favor of defendants,

dismissing plaintiff's Complaint.
2.

The

parties

shall

each

bear

their

own

costs

and

attorney's fees.

^ , . _ . .._.

Dated this g^^-day of December, 1995.

Qi-JTh
ANNE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

,-"'" -X
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this,
1995:

Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
Kevin Egan Anderson
Attorney for Plaintiff
201 S. Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Kent S. Lewis
Deputy County Attorney
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

.day of December,

